Information security is one of the most important topics of our time. One thing is certain: There will always be attackers who try to exploit software gaps to abuse it. We are currently experiencing a rapid increase in the number of cyberattacks. Malicious actors – generally professionalized criminals or state attackers – are out to obtain confidential information, gain access to systems in order to control them, or damage them to such an extent that they are no longer operational.
Also, the system configuration changes, as devices are more and more connected. Former purely safety-relevant control units are now connected. This increases their vulnerability and need to be addressed in the system architecture since the start of development. In avionics, there are different safety and security standards available from the aircraft down to software or testing level. For security, there are generic certification standards like the Common Criteria or avionics-specific ones like the DO356/ED-203A.
For Common Criteria, the motives for cyberattacks play no role at all (or only a subordinate one), because actors are assigned with roles that make them tangible as a threat. A distinction is made whether a user compromises a system unintentionally or whether an attacker (referred to by the Common Criteria as a threat agent) attacks a system deliberately. But this only matters insofar as these categories are considered from the perspective of damage and the "assets to be defended" (specifically the components of a system).
The presentation showed which security standards affect software development. There are generic ones like the Common Criteria or avionics-specific ones like the DO356/ED-203A. We helped our audience to better understand those differences and how they can be applied to the OS level impacting Avionics systems and what still needs to be done based on an application example.
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